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THE LIFE-SAVING EXCEPTION TO
CONFIDENTIALITY: RESTATING LAW
WITHOUT THE WAS, THE WILL BE, OR THE
OUGHT TO BE
Monroe H. Freedman*
When I was a first-year law student in 1951, Professor Lon Fuller
shocked his Contracts class by announcing that all Restatements of
the Law should be put in a pile and burned. The shock was on three
levels. World War II and the Nazi book burnings were only five
years behind us. Fuller was an extremely gentle and soft-spoken man.
And we were first-year students, believing in, and anxiously seeking,
"the rule" that would resolve each legal issue that we confronted.
Fuller's point, of course, was that a restatement of what the rule
was yesterday tended to blunt the lawyer's real concerns about legal
rules. In counseling clients we strive to predict what the rule will be
tomorrow, and the answer to that question is inseparable from the
lawyer's ultimate inquiry of what the rule ought to be.' In particular,
it is the ought that tends to get overlooked in the backward-looking
exercise of restating the law.
An extreme-indeed, bizarre-example of this tendency to
overlook the ought can be found in the American Law Institute's
(ALI) current effort to draft a Restatement of the Law Governing
Lawyers. The issue is whether a lawyer is required to maintain a
client's confidences even at the sacrifice of innocent human life. My
own answer, argued for more than two decades, is that human life
should take precedence over confidentiality.2 The answer of the ALI
* Howard Lichtenstein Distinguished Professor of Legal Ethics, Hofstra University,
and author of UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS' ETHICS (1990).
1. Oliver Wendell Holmes, considered by many to be the archetype legal positivist,
said that "[t]he law can ask no better justification than the deepest instincts of man."
OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, The Path of the Law, in COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 167,200
(1897).
2. See, e.g., THE AMERICAN LAWYER'S CODE OF CONDuCr Rule 1.4 (Alternative
A) (Public Discussion Draft, 1980); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS IN AN
ADVERSARY SYSTEM 6 (1975); MONROE H. FREEDMAN, UNDERSTANDING LAWYERS'
ETHICS 102-04 (1990) [hereinafter FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS]; Monroe H. Freedman,
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Reporter, Professor Charles Wolfram, is that, except in very limited
circumstances, confidentiality is more precious than human life. Yet
Wolfram has had no qualms about permitting lawyers to abandon
confidentiality to collect their own fees or to defend themselves
against charges of wrongdoing, and he goes so far as to require the
betrayal of client confidences to prevent or remedy a client's fraud on
the court.
There are three cases that have been used over the years to
illustrate the life-and-death issue. The first involves an innocent
person on death row. The client confesses to his lawyer that he
committed the murder for which another man is about to be executed.
The lawyer is unable to persuade the client to reveal the truth. Is the
lawyer permitted to reveal information reasonably believed to be
necessary to stop the execution?3
In the second case defense counsel is informed by the defense's
medical expert that the plaintiff has a life-threatening aortic aneurism.
The aneurism is readily operable but the plaintiff does not know
about it. It may have been caused by the accident that is at issue in
the litigation and therefore raises a serious risk of increasing the
damages. If the lawyer is unable to persuade the defendant to inform
the plaintiff, is the lawyer permitted to do so?4
The third case involves a bomb in Pennsylvania Station, planted
by the client's brother and set to go off at rush hour. The client,
seeking advice about his own potential liability for his brother's crime,
tells the lawyer that he has been unsuccessful in dissuading his brother
from committing the crime, but he forbids the lawyer to reveal the
information to prevent the crime. Is the lawyer nevertheless
permitted to reveal the information necessary to prevent the bomb
from going off?5
The fact that the questions posed in these cases are seriously
debated within the legal profession is itself a kind of sick lawyer joke.
Consider the Restatement. In May of 1989 the members of the ALI
Are There Public Interest Limits on Lawyers' Advocacy?, 2 J. LEGAL PROF. 47,51 (1977);
Monroe H. Freedman, Lawyer-Client Confidences Under the A.B.A. Model Rules: Ethical
Rules Without Ethical Reason, CRIM. JUST. ETHICS, Summer/Fall 1984, at 3, 6-7.
3. See Arizona v. Macumber, 582 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1978) (refusing to allow alleged
confession by third party in a murder trial on the grounds of privilege).
4. See Spaulding v. Zimmerman, 116 N.W.2d 704 (Minn. 1962).
5. See FREEDMAN, LAWYERS' ETHICS, supra note 2, at 103.
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addressed a variation of the innocent person on death row dilemma.6
The conclusion expressed in Illustration 4, consistent with the text of
the proposed rules on confidentiality, was that the lawyer was
forbidden to reveal the information in order to save the life of the
innocent person.7
Professor Wolfram, as Reporter for the Restatement, presented
the rules and described them as "very important" and "squeaky
traditional." Professor Carl A. Auerbach protested:
I am horrified by Illustration 4 .... When we regard the
whole range of exceptions to the privilege, both in these
sections and in the preceding sections that deal with confi-
dences-that is, secrets-not covered by the attorney-client
privilege, I can't think of the policy behind one exception
that would amount to and is as grave as ... prevent[ing]
innocent people from going to their death.
Is there no basis on which we could temporize this
horrible consequence that I think outrages a sense of justice
and outrages lay persons about lawyers' ethics? Further-
more, I doubt that there is a bar in the country that would
take steps to discipline a lawyer who violated ... the
confidence of a client and revealed a secret that was
necessary to save an innocent life.'
The "whole range of exceptions" to which Auerbach referred
includes disclosing client information to defend the lawyer against "a
charge by any person that the lawyer.., acted wrongfully during the
course of representing a client,"9 and disclosing client information to
collect the lawyer's fee.'" In addition, section 118 requires the lawyer
to "take reasonable remedial measures" to correct false testimony
given by the client, which may include disclosure of confidential client
information."
One would think that the issue would have ended right there,
with the Reporter confessing error-even relief-at having the rule
6. ALI, 66TH ANNUAL MEETING, THE AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE: PROCEEDINGS
1989, at 332-339 (1990) [hereinafter PROCEEDINGS] (addressing RESTATEMENT OF THE
LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132, illus. 4 (Tentative Draft No. 2, 1989)).
7. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW: THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 132, illus. 4
(Tentative Draft No. 2, 1989) [hereinafter LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS].
8. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6 at 332-33.
9. LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 7, § 116.
10. Id § 117.
11. Id. § 118.
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and its illustration so effectively challenged. Indeed, Wolfram
expressed agreement with "most of the sentiment." 2  But mere
sentiment was not enough. "This is law," he explained, incorrectly,
"at its most logical and I think supportable as a matter of restate-
ment., 13 He went on to acknowledge that an exception could be
made, but protested that such an exception would have to be made
"out of the whole cloth., 14
The whole-cloth argument is, of course, nonsense. Wolfram was
relying on a single case, Arizona v. Macumber,5 in which, as
Professor Hodes points out, the state bar ethics committee had in fact
held that the lawyers could ethically reveal the information. 6 In
addition, Wolfram conceded that in England Illustration 4 would be
decided "in a diametrically opposite manner."'7 As a matter of
logic, as well as morality, an exception to save innocent human life is
far more compelling than those exceptions already accepted by the
Reporter.
Professors Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. and W. William Hodes argue
that the lawyer in a life-or-death case could, under "moral compul-
sion," engage in "conscientious civil disobedience" against a rule
imposing silence on the lawyer. 8 Moreover, they, along with
Professor Auerbach, recognize that "most bar authorities would
probably share [the lawyer's] moral revulsion [against a rule forbid-
ding disclosure to save life], and would elect not to press forward with
a disciplinary charge, should one be filed by the client."' 9  That
authoritative view is itself part of the was that a Restatement should
be seeking to restate.20
12. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 333.
13. Id.
14. Id. Professor Wolfram also expressed a "sense of outrage ... in an undifferentiat-
ed justice sense" [sic], but again protested that "the law" doesn't allow the exception. Id.
15. 582 P.2d 162 (Ariz. 1978).
16. See W. William Hodes, What Can Be Done?, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1547, 1575-76
(1996).
17. PROCEEDINGs, supra note 6, at 333.
18. GEOFFREY C. HAZARD & W. WILLIAM HODES, THE LAW OF LAWYERING: A
HANDBOOK ON THE MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDucr § 1.6:304 (2d ed. Supp.
1993).
19. Id. It is certainly true that the problem of bad drafting can be solved with civil
disobedience. But civil disobedience is necessary only if we insist upon drafting admittedly
outrageous rules. It would be preferable to simply rewrite the rule to avoid the outrageous
result.
20. See also Maura Strassberg, Taking Ethics Seriously: Beyond Positivist Jurispru-
dence in Legal Ethics, 80 IOWA L. REV. 901, 949 (1995) (noting that "codifications such
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The ALI debate returned again to the anomalous nature of the
exceptions with the following observation by Professor Douglas R.
Heidenreich:
If it becomes important for the lawyer to disclose the very
same information because the lawyer is charged with mal-
practice or because the lawyer has been charged with a
possible disciplinary violation or indeed if it is necessary to
disclose that information for the lawyer to collect her fee,
then it's okay. So, for the lawyer to save her own skin, or
indeed her pocketbook, it's all right to disclose that informa-
tion.21
Heidenreich added, "I would like to see us express Carl's sense of
outrage and suggest that this is a really grotesque... situation ....
It seems to me that if that is indeed the law, we ought to say, in the
strongest terms, that it is a terrible law."'
The absurdity among the exceptions was further highlighted by
Richard B. Allen. What if the guilty client were called as a witness
in the prosecution of the innocent defendant, Allen asked, and the
client gave false testimony incriminating the defendant? Wouldn't the
lawyer be required to take remedial measures to correct the false
testimony, which could include revealing the client's guilt?'
Wolfram evaded the question, but Allen's point was obvious: the
Restatement would forbid the lawyer to reveal the truth to save an
innocent life, but would require the lawyer to do so to correct false
testimony.
The upshot of the debate was the adoption of the position taken
by Professor Paul Carrington, who said: "[W]e don't need this
Illustration. This is more clarity than we really need."'24 By a vote
of 164 to 65, the members agreed, voting to eliminate the illustration.
At the same time, though, they left standing the underlying rules and
exceptions relating to confidentiality and lawyer-client privilege that
compel the result that had provoked the widespread sense of injustice
and outrage.25
as the Model Code or Model Rules must be interpreted in light of embedded moral and
political principles").
21. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 334.
22. Id.
23. Id at 338.
24. Id. at 336.
25. Id. at 339.
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As of May of 1995 the status of the rules on confidentiality was
as follows: Section 111 defined confidential client information broadly
as "information relating to representation of a client acquired by a
lawyer. ' 26 Section 112 forbade the lawyer to disclose such informa-
tion if doing so would "adversely affect a material interest of the
client" or if the client instructed the lawyer to maintain confidentiali-
ty.7 Then, an exception in section 117A permitted the lawyer to
disclose client information if "[t]he client intends to commit a crime
or fraud that threatens to cause death or serious bodily injury.
28
As a member of the Members Consultative Group,29 I argued
that the May 1995 draft of section 117A was deficient in two
important respects. First, the exception applied only if the client
"intends to commit a crime or fraud."3 Thus, in the case of the
aneurism and in the case of the innocent person on death row, the
lawyer would be forbidden to reveal the life-saving information.
The reason is two-fold-the client has no intention of committing
any act at all, and his silence is not a crime or fraud. Second, the
exception applies only if the act is one to be done by the client. Thus,
in the case of the bomb planted by the client's brother, the lawyer
would be forbidden to give the information necessary to prevent the
disaster. Even if the explosion itself would complete a crime, the
crime would not be the client's.
31
The exception to save human life is far more compelling than the
other exceptions to confidentiality that the Restatement has already
recognized. Death is indeed different and the value at stake therefore
outweighs the financial interests of the lawyer or of third parties. As
observed by Justice Sandra Day O'Connor, "[t]he [Supreme] Court
... has recognized ... the qualitative difference of death from all
other punishments. 32 Ironically, Professor Wolfram's priorities are
otherwise; while rejecting an exception for human life, he has
26. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS § 111 (Preliminary Draft No.
11, 1995).
27. 1& § 112.
28. Id. § 117A(1).
29. I was not a member of the ALI at the time of the 1989 debate.
30. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 26, § 117A.
31. In some jurisdictions the client's silence might constitute misprision of a felony and
§ 117A could be construed to include that crime. But the ethical rule should not turn on
whether there is or is not a criminal misprision statute and whether the crime of misprision
would include mere silence.
32. California v. Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998 (1983).
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repeatedly pushed for an exception that would permit divulgence of
client confidences to protect third parties from client fraud.
Moreover, an exception to save life would pose no significant
systemic threat to lawyer-client confidentiality. Unlike cases of client
perjury, fraud, or nonpayment of fees, which are all too common,
cases involving human life are scant. Thus, Wolfram is willing to
accept divulgence of confidences in the more common situations, yet
balks at allowing it in the truly extraordinary case-extraordinary
both in importance and in occurrence.
Furthermore, as Bennett Boskey noted in the 1989 debate:
It [is] a great mistake to state a rule and then find that it
must be applied in absolute terms under all circumstances no
matter how egregiously offensive the result seems to us to be
from the standpoint of justice. . . . [P]rinciples sometimes
have their limits short of the infinite, and.., this one should
stop short of this case.33
In short, to push the confidentiality rule to the mindless and immoral
extreme of sacrificing innocent human life is "rigour and not law."34
In the discussion of the Consultative Group in May of 1995, it
became clear that there was a consensus that section 117A should be
redrafted to change those results. Accordingly, at the suggestion of
the Director, Professor Hazard, I wrote to Wolfram35 after the
meeting and suggested the following redraft of section 117A: "A
lawyer may use or disclose confidential client information to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes disclosure to be necessary to
prevent death or serious bodily injury to a person."36
For whatever reason, Wolfram rejected that language. In Council
Draft No. 11, Wolfram recast my proposal for amending section 117A
in the following prolix, convoluted, and confusing way, which he
submitted as Version One:
33. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 335.
34. WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE WINTER'S TALE act 3, se. 2, at 117 (Wilbur L. Cross
& Tucker Brooke eds., Barnes & Noble 1993).
35. Letter from Monroe H. Freedman to Charles W. Wolfram (June 21, 1995) (on file
with Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review).
36. Id. I added the following comment:
I don't think the prefatory, "Following a good faith attempt ... [to dissuade the
client]" is needed, because if the client can be persuaded to do the right thing,
then disclosure isn't "necessary" to prevent the death. This point could be
included in a comment that would emphasize that disclosure must be limited to
what is "necessary."
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Following a good faith attempt by the lawyer, if feasible,
to persuade the client to use or disclose the information for
the same purpose or, if relevant, to dissuade the client from
committing an act threatening such harm, a lawyer may use
or disclose confidential client information if and to the
extent the lawyer reasonably believes that such use or
disclosure is necessary to prevent death or serious bodily
injury to a person.
3 7
As an alternative, Wolfram proposed a Version Two of his own,
which maintained the element of the client's crime or fraud:
Following a good faith attempt by the lawyer, if feasible,
to dissuade the client, a lawyer may use or disclose confiden-
tial client information if and to the extent the lawyer
reasonably believes that the client intends to commit or has
committed a crime or fraud threatening death or serious
bodily injury to a person and such use or disclosure is
necessary to prevent the harm.38
Oddly, Version Two, which requires more text-because of the
additional notion of crime or fraud-is shorter than Wolfram's
convoluted redraft of my version.
At a meeting on October 18, 1995, the ALI Council39 voted to
adopt Wolfram's Version Two. As a result, we are back where we
started. The lawyer would be forbidden to reveal the information
necessary to save life in all three of the cases that have caused so
much concern-the innocent person on death row, the plaintiff who
is unaware of the life-threatening aneurism, and the bomb planted by
the brother in Penn Station.4 °
The debate is not over. At the very least, the issue will have to
return to the membership of the ALI before the Restatement is finally
37. RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF GOVERNING LAWYERS, supra note 26, § 117A
(Version One).
38. ld. § 117A (Version Two).
39. I am not a member of the Council.
40. There is an argument, although strained, that the life of the innocent person on
death row could be saved under Version Two. It would require interpreting and
expanding the plain-meaning reach of the phrase "or has committed a crime ...
threatening death or serious bodily injury." RESTATEMENT OF THE LAW OF GOVERNING
LAWYERS, supra note 26, § 117A (Version Two). The problem is that, in context, the
language is limited to saving the person who was originally threatened by death or serious
bodily injury, not the person who is wrongly accused of the act. And, of course, good
drafting should avoid the need for such interpretive acrobatics.
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approved. But Lon Fuller's mordant point about the misguided
nature of restatements has been demonstrated to a degree of
absurdity that he could never have anticipated. Even if Wolfram
were right in saying that his draft "very much corresponds to current
law" 41-and he is not-he would still have us ignore the law that will
be and, more important, the law that ought to be.
Postscript
Copies of the page proofs of this article were provided at the
annual meeting of the American Law Institute, which took place in
Washington, D.C., May 14-17, 1996. At that meeting, the members
overwhelmingly approved an amendment to the Restatement of the
Law Governing Lawyers, Proposed Final Draft No. 1, section 117A.
The amendment eliminated the requirements that the threat to human
life be the result of an act by the client and that the act be criminal.
As adopted, section 117A now reads:
§ 117A. Using or Disclosing Information to Prevent Death
[or] Serious Bodily Injury ....
(1) A lawyer may use or disclose confi-
dential client information when and
to the extent the lawyer reasonably
believes necessary to prevent:
(a) death or serious bodily injury
to a person; ....
41. PROCEEDINGS, supra note 6, at 332.
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